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ABSTRACT 
In 2002, Belgium has adopted an electronic identity card as one of the first countries in Europe. By the 
end of 2009, the roll-out of the eID card will be completed. This means that each Belgian citizen will 
possess an eID card. The card enables her to digitally prove her identity and to legally sign electronic 
documents. The Belgian eID card opens up new opportunities for the government, its citizens, service 
providers and application developers. The Belgian eID technology originally aimed at facilitating 
transactions between Belgian citizens and the government. Although many eID applications have been 
developed, the success of the Belgian eID technology has not been what was expected. Therefore, the 
Belgian government encourages developers to build commercial applications that use the eID card (for 
authentication or e-signatures). However, extending the scope of the Belgian eID technology from e-
government to the commercial sector is no sinecure and not without risks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Every Belgian citizen (older than 12) has an electronic identity card since 2009. The Belgian Electronic 
identity card (BeID) allows citizens to identify themselves, to authenticate and to sign electronic 
documents. The BeID technology originally aimed at facilitating transactions with the Belgian 
government. Using the BeID authentication and/or e-signature functionality, citizens can get access to 
personal information stored in governmental databases1 (such as personal records at the National 
Registration Office), retrieve official documents2 (such as proof of birth/life/residence/nationality), 
declare their taxes3, report criminal offences, etc. The card also supports identification of the card holder 
to police forces and to authorized border control officials. Identification with the BeID avoids 
inconsistencies and results in more reliable governmental databases (e.g. no double entries for the same 
individual due to manual input errors). Moreover, the card technology impedes counterfeiting and hence, 
identity fraud. Orthogonal to the basic functionality of the card, user-friendliness and restriction of 
integration/deployment costs were crucial concerns. As mainly governmental applications4 were targeted, 
privacy was less important5. These concerns had an impact on the design of the BeID card. For instance, 
                                                 
1
 See also Belgian National Registration website. http://www.ibz.rrn.fgov.be/. 
2
 See also Mijn dossier. https://www.mijndossier.rrn.fgov.be/. 
3
 Seel also Tax-on-web. http://www.taxonweb.be/. 
4
 See also My Belgium e-government services. http://my.belgium.be/. 
5
 See also Privacy Features of European eID Card Specifications.  ENISA Position Paper. January 2009. 
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the user’s address is stored in the chip and is not printed on the card. Hence, there is no need for issuing a 
new BeID when a user moves to another address (i.e. the address file can be updated). Furthermore, the 
card implements no access control mechanism to read out the stored picture, identity and address files. 
Hence, the police can easily retrieve the data while keeping the infrastructural costs minimal (a simple 
card reader suffices; no keys/certificates need to be installed or regularly updated). Another concern was 
the “simplicity to integrate the BeID in existing or new applications”. Application developers should not 
be security experts, and hence, it should be easy to use the BeID as a means to authenticate to web 
services. Since TLS (SSL) is one of the paradigms for mutual authentication in web applications, it 
seemed appropriate to make the card TLS-compatible. The threat model and design decisions (driven by 
low cost, high usability and easy deployment) were reasonable in the initial setting (i.e. the e-government 
domain). However, these design decisions result in serious privacy and security risks when extending the 
BeID technology to other domains (e.g. the commercial sector) (Verhaeghe et al., 2008). Currently, many 
countries and regions are planning to introduce eID technology.  Each of them will be confronted with 
similar design decisions. Testing and evaluating the technology within one domain and later extending it 
gradually to other domains seems a good strategy. This strategy is indeed reasonable to evaluate certain 
parameters (such as usability, performance and cost). Yet, changing the setting may also change the 
privacy and security risks.  
This paper elaborates on those risks and presents (partial) solutions. The rest of this chapter is structured 
as follows. First, an overview of the BeID technology (the card, the middleware and existing BeID 
applications) is presented (see section 2). Second, the crucial barriers that delay and hinder the 
development of commercial eID applications are classified (see section 3) and some (ad hoc) solutions are 
presented. Next, more structural approaches are discussed to accelerate commercial eID applications with 
the current card. The requirements and solutions resulted from discussions with many SMEs and large 
companies in Flanders within the scope of a technology transfer project funded by the government. 
Reusable software extensions as well as a framework that integrates the crucial components for privacy-
friendly eID applications are presented. It will be shown that those solutions may tackle some major 
weaknesses and will lead to second generation BeID applications. However, some security threats still 
remain and can only be solved by a different eID design. The current BeID is therefore compared with 
other approaches, namely a domain-specific approach and a service-specific approach (e.g. the German 
eID card). The alternatives are compared and evaluated on multiple parameters (infrastructural cost, 
performance, usability, security and privacy). This chapter ends with a general conclusion. 
OVERVIEW OF THE BELGIAN EID TECHNOLOGY 
The Belgian eID card (Stern, 2003) is a smart card that allows Belgian citizens to both visually and 
digitally prove their identity and to sign electronic documents. The eID card contains three files: (1) a 
digital picture of the card holder, (2) an identity file, which contains the basic identity information and a 
hash value of the picture file; and is signed by the National Registry, and (3) an address file which 
contains the card holder's current place of residence; it is also signed by the National Registry together 
with the identity file to guarantee the link between both files. 
The card contains two public key pairs: one for authentication purposes, the other for e-signing. 
The two private keys SKAuth and SKSig are securely stored in a tamper-resistant part of the chip and can be 
activated with a PIN code. The corresponding public key (PKAuth and PKSig) are each certified in a 
certificate further listing the card holder’s name and her nation-wide unique identification number (i.e. the 
National Registration Number or NRN).  The Belgian government offers a middleware package 
(Rommelaere, 2003) to facilitate interactions with the eID card.  The middleware GUI allows end-users to 
read the files, to retrieve the certificates that are stored in the eID card and to change the PIN code. It also 
acts as an intermediary for all accesses to the eID card by other applications. When a document has to be 
signed, the middleware passes a hash of the document to the card. Similarly, a hash of the challenge is 
passed to the card when authentication is required.  A middleware popup window appears whenever the 
user is required to enter his PIN code; depending on the card reader (with or without embedded PIN pad), 
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the PIN is read by the middleware and sent to the card or the card reader forwards the PIN directly to the 
card. Likewise, the middleware can verify the validity of certificates (using CRL6 or OCSP). Note, 
however, that the official middleware is not essential: there are several commercial versions available and 
an application can always implement the middleware’s functionality itself and directly interact with the 
card. 
CLASSIFICATION OF EID BARRIERS 
This section classifies the eID barriers according to five categories: barriers with respect to 
authentication, those with respect to identification, infrastructural barriers, legal/ethical/social barriers 
and technological barriers. 
 
The translation of the requirements for the eID card into its design involved a few decisions that have a 
major impact on the security and privacy risks when the initial scope of the card is extended from the e-
governmental sector to the commercial domain.  Since the BeID card has to be “TLS-compatible”, the 
authentication protocol should be service-independent. In this protocol, the service sends a challenge to 
the card, which responds with a signature on that challenge and the certificate chain, necessary for 
verifying the signature. 
The second consequence of TLS-compliance is that the card must implement single sign-on (SSO), since 
the TLS-protocol may require re-authentication after a timeout. It means that the card holder has to input 
her PIN code once to activate the authentication key (SKAuth); after that, the card will perform any number 
of authentications until the card is removed from the card reader or an explicit logoff command is sent to 
the card. 
The second requirement, “easy deployment for police forces”, is realized by the design decision that it 
should be possible to read out the card with a simple card reader. Hence, no access control (for reading) is 
implemented. Picture, identity file, address file and both certificates can be read without any restrictions 
(no PIN code or user confirmation is required). To avoid abuse by applications, the official middleware 
locks the card reader and prompts the card holder (in a popup window) for her consent when a read-
request was received from an application. The locking of the card reader has been removed in future 
versions of the middleware, since it prevents that other smart cards are being used (e.g. bank cards). 
Barriers with respect to authentication 
The Belgian eID card has originally been designed to facilitate interactions between citizens and the 
government. Hence, the threat model is only relevant and reasonable for eID applications in this domain. 
Therefore, the usage of the eID card in other domains (commercial, financial7, medical, . . . ) will 
inevitably introduce new threats.  Most of them are caused by design decisions based on “wrong” 
assumptions.  
 
A prototypical attack in this category exploits the SSO “feature” of the card. Malicious applications can 
surreptitiously authenticate the card owner to other service providers.  For instance, a dubious insurance 
company could build an applet that allows clients to access personal financial information (i.e. info about 
their insurance policies) from their home. The applet requires authentication with the eID card. However, 
once the PIN code has been given, the applet can secretly perform multiple authentications towards other 
services without further user interaction.  Hence, it can retrieve personal information from governmental 
databases or other commercial sites to which the user has been registered via her eID card.  For instance, 
the applet can retrieve loan and tax information or the user’s profile at an Internet shop. In the original 
threat model, this is a less serious issue since governmental institutions already share a lot of data and, 
                                                 
6
 See also The Belgian certificate revocation list. http://status.eid.belgium.be/. 
7
 See also The KeyTrade bank. http://www.keytrade.be/. 
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hence, these applications would not benefit from this exploit. However, even in this case, the card remains 
vulnerable to spyware. Such a program just waits for a program (usually a browser) to access a known e-
government site which requires BeID authentication; the spyware can then abuse the BeID card to 
secretly login into other websites and steal or modify the card holder’s personal information. 
The SSO-attack will become more important since the number of BeID applications will inevitably 
increase.  First, as the roll-out of the BeID card has been completed by the end of 2009, commercial 
service providers will be tempted to use the BeID card as a strong authentication means. For instance, the 
bank sector currently studies the feasibility to use the BeID card for accessing bank accounts and other 
financial information and for performing financial transactions (i.e. home banking). Second, the 
government also plans to develop new BeID applications. More specifically, personal medical 
information will become accessible using the BeID.  Hence, malicious service providers can build even 
more detailed profiles of their customers using reliable and even more sensitive personal information.   
One straightforward solution to tackle this weakness is to deactivate the authentication key (i.e. logoff) 
after each authentication, but this could result in users having to enter their PIN code several times when 
the authentication is based on TLS. Logging-off can be done by either the middleware or the application 
and will prevent external programs (such as spyware and viruses) to use the card for secret authentications 
but does not solve the problem of malicious applets since they can access the BeID card directly (without 
mediation of the middleware).  
A better solution is to authenticate the card holder after the TLS-connection has been set up or to use 
alternative authentication protocols. However, mutual authentication over TLS is a well-known paradigm 
for application developers who are no security experts. Moreover, as many cards have already been 
distributed, it will be very difficult and costly to revise the SSO feature. 
 
A second consequence of the “TLS-compliance” is that authentication is server-independent. It means 
that the signed challenge does not refer to the “intended” destination server. Hence, the card holder 
always remains in a state of uncertainty to which remote service she is authenticating. Even if the 
middleware intercepts every authentication request and prompts the card holder for her consent, the pop-
up window can only show the name of the requesting program (usually the browser), but not the intended 
service. If the name of that service would be sent to the card together with the challenge, and both were 
signed by the card, the card holder could have absolute certainty when a card reader with separate display 
is used: that display could show the authentication request and the intended service; hence, the card 
holder could always abort unwanted authentications. 
This “non-standard” authentication protocol is, however, not compatible with TLS, and was, therefore, 
not implemented. However, as the BeID card can be seen as a master key that opens doors to many 
databases and services, the card designers should at least have made it more difficult to secretly abuse the 
card. 
A straightforward solution to counter this kind of abuse of the card does not exist. A minimal solution 
consists of compelling the service providers to maintain a history of authentications, and to present this 
history each time the card holder accesses the service. It would even be better to have the BeID card keep 
a record of the last n authentications, which could then be regularly inspected by the card holder via the 
middleware. Of course, the latter solution is only useful if the card is kept informed about the services to 
which it authenticates. 
 
A last design decision (in the authentication context) that leads to new threats is related to the 
authentication and signature certificates that are stored in the card. Both certificates contain uniquely 
identifying information, such as the NRN and the name of the card holder. This decision carries the seed 
of a possible “Big Brother” situation. If the same certificates are used across multiple domains, a health 
care provider (such as a home care organization), a bank (which belongs to the financial sector) and a 
commercial service provider (such as a travel agency or a book shop) could exchange their users’ profiles 
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and, hence, easily link these profiles. As a result, the travel agency can charge more expensive rates to 
wealthy clients; the bank can increase the life insurance’s premium of people that need medical home 
care, etc. The exchange of information is especially important when mergers or takeovers happen. 
A solution to this problem consists of keeping one (or two) certificates per domain on the BeID card (i.e. 
card holders authenticate (or sign) with a domain-specific certificate). Domain-specific unique identifiers 
should be used in these certificates instead of one global unique identifier. Current smartcards can already 
store a substantial number of certificates.  Of course, this assumes that service providers first authenticate 
towards the card; their certificates then indicate to which domain they belong. The server certificates can 
be verified by the software/middleware on the client workstation or preferably on the BeID card (see also 
next section).   
Barriers with respect to identification 
A design decision with a major effect is the lack of access control to the different files and certificates 
that are stored in the BeID. There is limited access control: the files and certificates are only readable (by 
everyone) and cannot be modified except for the address file, which can only be updated by the National 
Registry after proper authentication towards the card. It was reasonable to require that authorities (e.g. 
police) can access the information in the eID card without restriction (no PIN code required), since an 
infringer or criminal could pretend to have forgotten his PIN code. Having the police authenticate towards 
the card is an alternative, but the maintenance cost would be high (to install private keys and 
corresponding certificates in all the devices used by the police force).  The official middleware intercepts 
read-operations and requests (in a popup window) the card holder’s consent. However, a malicious 
application can directly access the BeID card and thus circumvent this interception. Currently, the BeID is 
used in hotels to automatically fill in the hotel register and at container waste parks to verify that the card 
holder is a citizen of the local municipality. Since cautious users are well aware that these files might be 
read by malicious applications, they will be reluctant to use their eID card in dubious commercial 
applications (such as access to sauna or fitness centers). Since the card itself never requests the card 
holder’s approval, it is impossible to prevent with 100% certainty this kind of threat. Hence, whenever the 
eID card is used, spyware might secretly read the content of the card and forward the information to 
criminal organizations, which may infer that the card holder is currently far from home and criminals may 
visit her residence. 
A straightforward solution to this problem is to have the service provider authenticate towards the card 
before allowing access to these files. The service provider’s certificate should restrict what can be 
retrieved from the card. There is of course the problem that the card cannot verify whether the certificate 
has been revoked or not, since the card does not have direct access to the Internet. However, (imperfect) 
solutions can be devised such as verification by the middleware, certificates with a short validity period or 
a modified OCSP-response which includes a challenge of the card. 
A pervert side effect of having identity and address files that are signed by the National Registry is that 
such files have a higher “commercial” value, since the information is guaranteed by the government. It is 
to be expected that these files will be collected and sold for commercial purposes. 
Infrastructural barriers 
Lack of flexible and advanced organizational procedures also seriously hinders the extension of the 
scope of the BeID technology to new domains: e.g. the time-consuming recovery procedure when the 
BeID card is stolen, lost or defect is unacceptable for many commercial applications. Currently many 
companies study the feasibility of using the BeID to log in into their local intranet. To remedy this 
problem, the administration will in the future distribute “blank cards” which can be used for this purpose. 
These cards will only contain a key pair and certificate to allow for temporary authentication.  
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A second issue is the card reader. The official website lists simple (cheap) card readers with neither 
separate keypad nor display. With these card readers, users have to enter their PIN code in a popup 
window using the PC’s keyboard.  Hence, keyboard sniffers can capture the PIN and use it whenever the 
eID card is put in the card reader.  More advanced card readers with separate keypad and display are 
necessary to reduce risks.  Such readers can even solve the SSO problem by automatically deactivating 
the key pair after each authentication. 
To increase the quality and trustworthiness of digital signatures, a trusted authority and online Internet 
access are required.  More specifically, reliable timestamps are typically added to digital signatures to 
increase their trustworthiness.  Without a timestamp –or with an incorrect one– a citizen can sign a 
contract and subsequently revoke his BeID certificates.  Thereafter, he can claim that the signature was 
made after the certificates were revoked. 
Finally, many web service providers authenticate to clients using TLS connections. However, a 
substantial subset of them does not possess verifiable server certificates.  In some cases, server 
certificates are self-signed or expired.  The government’s PKI should also issue server certificates. 
Legal, ethical and social barriers 
Governmental BeID applications honour the privacy legislation. However, more restrictive privacy laws 
apply to commercial organizations. For instance, commercial organizations are not allowed to store the 
user's NRN. However, this nation-wide unique number is disclosed every time the BeID card is used for 
authentication or signature generation, since the NRN is embedded in every certificate and in the identity 
file. Hence, a company is not allowed to keep a record of the citizen's signing certificate, which is 
nevertheless necessary to be able to prove later that the citizen’s signature is valid. 
Ethical barriers may also hinder the use of the BeID technology.  The BeID certificates contain the card 
holder’s name and NRN. However, the NRN is a compound number: it consists of the date of birth and 
some extra digits which are odd for males and even for females. Hence, the receiver of the certificate can 
already derive the card holder’s name, date of birth and gender. Even more information is kept in the 
identity and address files.  In most cases, usage of the BeID card will reveal more personal information 
than is strictly required by the service. In the previous section, we already discussed the lack of access 
control; in this section, we present a solution to the unlimited disclosure of personal information.  
Instead of keeping all the personal information in plaintext in the certificates and identity and address 
files, the information could be encrypted or hashed, and their plaintext values should only be revealed 
with the card holder’s consent (assuming a secure card reader with separate keypad and display). The 
server certificates (used in the access control mechanism described in the previous section) could already 
restrict the list of accessible personal information. Hence, the card holder only has to further limit this list. 
Technological barriers 
Most SMEs that develop eID applications do not employ security experts. There is also only a limited 
support offered by the government. Examples of primitive BeID applications or first generation BeID 
applications (i.e. applications that use the BeID for every transaction or service consumption) are listed in 
the tutorial.  The middleware allows developers to access the BeID through an intuitive API. Also, a 
reverse proxy is available to verify the validity of BeID certificates at the server side (using CRLs or 
OCSP) when TLS-based authentication is used.  At the client side, the card holder needs only to install 
the middleware on his PC. 
More advanced design and development skills are required to develop applications with stricter security, 
privacy and mobility requirements.  Advanced eID applications or second generation eID applications 
use the BeID as bootstrap to obtain privacy-friendly credentials (such as pseudonym certificates or 
anonymous credentials). These credentials could be issued by a trusted identity provider when the user 
registers (with her BeID card) with the service provider.  They can later be used with every transaction or 
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service consumption and since the BeID card is not necessary anymore, they can be transferred to mobile 
devices.  Hence, the user does no longer need a card reader to authenticate.  Although this approach 
increases the quality of BeID applications –in terms of privacy, security, mobility and usability– the 
design and development complexity of the applications may increase considerably.  This is, however, a 
real impediment for many SMEs.  Therefore, the eIDea research project (Naessens, 2009) has built (a) 
reusable software components and (b) a framework with simple interfaces for application programmers. 
The software components increase the usability and mobility properties of BeID applications and can 
bootstrap applications which require accountability/liability but allow for pseudonymity or even 
anonymity. The framework hides the complexity of cryptographic building blocks from application 
programmers.  The rest of this paper focuses on concrete examples of technological support that has been 
developed during the eIDea project.  The software support originates from real needs of SMEs. We also 
illustrate their feasibility with several examples. 
 
REUSABLE SOFTWARE EXTENSIONS 
The Belgian eID card allows users to authenticate and to digitally sign documents.  The former is realized 
by signing the hash of a challenge sent by the server using the private key for authentication (i.e. 
SigneID(Hash(challenge), KeyAuth)).  A signature is generated by signing the hash of the document using 
the private key for signing (i.e. SigneID(Hash(document), KeySig)).  Note that the challenge and document 
are hashed by the middleware on the workstation.  Only the hash value is sent to the card because of the 
limited processing and storage capabilities of smart cards.  Often, security building blocks other than 
authentication or signing are required in many applications.  This section describes how symmetric keys 
and proxy certificates can be generated using the eID technology (Lapon et al., 2009).  Next, we 
demonstrate the applicability of both extensions and evaluate possible constraints. 
Generation of secure symmetric keys 
To generate a symmetric key based on the BeID, the user first generates an  (possibly public) input string.  
The hash of that input string is signed with one of both private keys (SKX) of the BeID card.  The result is 
a seed to be used to generate a symmetric key K.  K can then be used to encrypt data.  The encrypted data 
and the input string can be stored locally or at a remote location.  Table 1 shows the basic protocol. 
 
Table 1. Generation of a secure symmetric key 
U: inputString ← generateInput ( ) 
U: seed ← signeID (Hash(inputString), SKX) 
U: K ← generateSymmetricKey (seed) 
U: cipherText ← encrypt (plainText, K) 
U → S: send (cipherText || inputString) 
S: store (cipherText || inputString) 
 
This simple protocol opens up new opportunities for many application developers.  The basic protocol is 
typically useful for securely storing credentials (tickets, passwords, private keys) or other confidential 
information on the user’s workstation or at a remote location.  Variants can be made based on the specific 
setting or the application in which the extension is used: 
- SKX  can be either SKAuth or SKSig.  By using SKAuth the card holder only has to enter her PIN code once 
and, hence, can then generate many seeds.  This is particularly useful if each piece of data needs to be 
encrypted with a different secret key.  SKSig is more secure since a PIN code is required for every 
generation of a seed. 
- The inputString can either be a random value, a string that specifies the exact location where the 
cipherText will be stored, user info (such as the serial number of the BeID card) or a combination 
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thereof.  If inputString specifies the exact location, then it is not necessary to append it to the stored 
cipherText.  However, using a random value allows users to generate a new key, K*,  in case the 
previous key, K, is compromised. 
- The protocol can be extended to hide the location (i.e. the index) at which the confidential data is 
stored. An attacker who succeeds to retrieve all (encrypted) records from the database cannot learn 
anything about who stored what in the database. The users generate the index as follows (see Table 
2): 
 
Table 2. Generation of a secure symmetric key and hidden index 
   … previous protocol (see Table 1) … 
U: index ← Hash (K) 
U → S: send (cipherText, index) 
S: store cipherText at location index 
 
- Confidential documents can also be shared among multiple users (i.e. a closed user group).  One user, 
U0, chooses a name for the group, which is also taken as the inputString and generates the secret key 
(see Table 1), K, with which the documents will be encrypted. Each other group member, Ui, then 
generates his own secret key, Ki, again using group name as inputString and  calculates Xi = Ki, ⊕ K. 
All Xis are published (X0 = 0).  Each group member Ui can access the files by regenerating his Ki, xor-
ing it with his Xi and using the result as the decryption key. 
 
This eID extension allows for ubiquitous access to shared/personal confidential information.  The only 
prerequisite is a smart card reader.  Of course, the card holder still has to trust the workstation as K is 
generated on the workstation.  As SKAuth and SKSig are card-specific, appropriate backup and recovery 
strategies must be worked out.  K can be stored on a trusted device (such as an USB stick) and/or 
encrypted with a key that is derived from the user’s PUK code (the card’s unblocking code).  
Alternatively, escrow servers can be used.  The merits and disadvantages of the alternatives are described 
by Bellare and Goldwasser (1997). 
Generation of proxy certificates 
The BeID card can be used to issue (i.e. sign) proxy certificates. A proxy certificate certifies the 
ownership of a public key. However, unlike ordinary certificates, proxy certificates are signed by another 
certificate of the owner and not by an external certification authority. It typically consists of a public key, 
the identity of the public key owner (i.e. the certificate holder) and has a limited validity period.  It is 
signed with the private signature key of the BeID as shown in Table 3. 
 
Table 3. Generating proxy certificates 
U: (SKU, PKU) ← generateKeyPair( ) 
U: proxyCert ← generateProxyCertificate (PKU, CerteID.Name, …, validity_period) 
U: proxyCert.signature ← signeID (proxyCert, SKSig) 
 
Proxy certificates allow individuals to delegate some of their rights to other devices and/or individuals.  
For instance, the proxy certificate, the corresponding private key SKU and the BeID signing certificate can 
be stored on a mobile device.  Hence, users can authenticate and/or sign documents using platforms where 
even no card reader is available.  Similarly, an employer can delegate a proxy certificate (with limited 
validity period and purpose) and corresponding private key to an employee who is responsible for the 
company’s tax declarations.  Note that proxy certificates can also be used to securely distribute (public) 
encryption keys.  To tackle major privacy and infrastructural concerns, BeID proxy certificates slightly 
deviate from the standards.  These modification are discussed in detail in (Lapon et al., 2009).  
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Proxy certificates are useful in many applications: two or more individuals can set up SSL/TLS 
connections without any intervention of a trusted Certification Authority (which is especially interesting 
in peer-to-peer applications); furthermore, they may solve management, usability and trust problems in 
secure mail protocols (such as S/MIME and PGP).   
FRAMEWORK DEVELOPMENT 
A framework8 (Diaz et al., 2007) supports the development of Belgian eID applications.  It offers 
application developers a generic interface to use more advanced building blocks while hiding their 
complexity.  The framework consists of managers and handlers.  A manager is responsible for one or 
more handlers of the same type.  An application either directly instantiates and invokes methods of a 
handler or delegates these tasks to the corresponding manager.  For instance, the application can select a 
particular type of connection and instantiate it directly (invoking methods of the communicationHandler).  
Or the application can call a communication manager.  The latter selects the type of connection and 
manages the connection.  The handlers in the framework are listed below (see also table 3): 
- The credential handler defines a generic interface to perform actions using multiple types of 
credentials (like signing, authenticating, issuing, verifying …).  Examples are the BeIDHandler, the 
X509Handler, the pseudonymCertificateHandler, the IdemixHandler9(Camenisch et al., 2001) … The 
BeIDHandler allows users to authenticate and sign data with the Belgian eID while the 
IdemixHandler allows authenticating anonymously and signing data. 
- The communication handler is responsible for sending and receiving messages between two entities.  
The handler provides a generic interface to set up different types of connections: (SSL over) TCP 
sockets, Bluetooth and NFC connections, anonymous communication channels10 (like TOR and JAP), 
… 
- The privacy handler manages local profiles which mirror the remote service provider’s profiles. This 
way, the user can keep track of what personal information has been disclosed to these service 
providers.   
- The policy handler analyses the service provider’s privacy policy and tries to match it with the user’s 
privacy preferences.  The user is warned when personal data threatens to be disclosed which should 
remain hidden according to the privacy preferences. 
- The dispute handler helps in collecting and providing evidence in case of a dispute between a user 
and service provider.  Examples are signed liabilities, transcripts of authentication sessions, … 
- The storage handler provides methods to store sensitive information such as tickets, personal data, 
credentials, evidence …) either locally or remotely. 
 
Figure 1. The ADAPID framework 
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 See also The ADAPID project website. https://www.cosic.esat.kuleuven.be/adapid/. 
9
 See also Idemix website. https://www.zurich.ibm.com/idemix. 
10
 See also (Goldschlag, 1997) 
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A major goal of the framework is to accelerate the development of BeID applications of high quality.  
The applicability of the framework is already validated through the development of multiple 
applications11.  The advantages offered by the framework are listed below: 
- Each component has a uniform interface (to clients and servers) that supports multiple technologies.  
For instance, the credentialHandler interface supports different credential technologies, the 
communicationHandler interface supports multiple types of connections … Hence, application 
developers do not have to deal with the complexity of the building blocks and can easily replace 
instantiations with a minimal effort.  For instance, replacing a pseudonymHandler by an 
IdemixHandler only requires a small modification in a configuration file. 
- The framework is open to developers.  Hence, developers can add new managers or handlers or 
provide an update of an existing implementation.  Application programmers have to select a 
technology, a provider (which contains the actual implementations) and a version of an actual 
implementation. 
OTHER APPROACHES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
It is by far not trivial to apply the Belgian eID technology across multiple domains.  Using the card 
directly to authenticate to commercial services introduces serious security and threats (especially when 
the card is used at an untrusted platform).  As discussed before, a feasible strategy for the Belgian eID 
consists of using the card only as a bootstrap to retrieve other (privacy-friendly) tokens.  However, this 
strategy seriously complicates the design of new eID applications.  The underlying shortcomings in the 
design of the BeID can be classified according to two categories: 
a. Lack of server authentication. Servers do not have to authenticate to the card.  The 
middleware could pop up a warning if servers do not authenticate successfully to the 
workstation.  However, applications can circumvent the middleware.  Moreover, many users 
ignore warnings caused by expired or invalid server certificates (i.e. they override the 
warnings). 
b. Coarse-grained access control.  Applications can read without any restrictions the 
information stored in the BeID (the picture, identity file, address file and certificates).  They 
can also successfully authenticate the card holder to multiple servers as soon as the user 
enters his PIN code.  In the authentication protocol, the user discloses the same set of 
personal information (independent of the particular service).  Moreover, each time uniquely 
identifying personal information is released (e.g. the NRN).  Hence, colluding service 
providers can easily build extensive profiles. 
To address these privacy and security threats (which increase when the BeID card is used across multiple 
domains), alternative designs are more appropriate.  The rest of this section evaluates and compares a 
domain-specific and a service-specific approach.  Both strategies use partial identities.  This means that 
citizens are known by a different pseudonym to each domain or service provider.  Moreover, the personal 
attributes that are disclosed depend on the specific domain or service.  For simplicity, this section only 
focuses on authentication (i.e. identification and digital signatures are not discussed). We also assume a 
card reader with separate key pad and display. 
 
A domain-specific approach is presented by Verhaeghe et al. (2008). Instead of storing only one 
certificate (and corresponding private key) on the card, multiple certificates (and private keys) are stored.  
Each certificate is meant to be used in one particular domain (e.g. the financial domain, the governmental 
domain, the commercial domain, the medical domain …).  Moreover, each certificate contains additional 
attrictutes that depend on the specific domain.  For instance, the user’s blood type is kept in his medical 
certificate whereas the NRN is kept in his governmental certificate. Each service provider (SP) also needs 
                                                 
11
 Lapon et al. (2008) have presented an ePetition system using the eID as a bootstrap; Verslype et al. (2008) have 
built a privacy-friendly ticketing system using the eID at the registration phase.  Both applications are built upon the 
framework. 
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its own certificate issued by a domain-specific CA.  The domain-specific CA is itself certified by a 
governmental CA (i.e. the root CA).  The public key PKroot of the governmental CA is stored in each 
BeID card.  Service providers first authenticate to the card.  The certificate chain can be verified in the 
card by means of PKroot.  Note that (1) the validity period of the server certificate and (2) its revocation 
status still need to be verified by the middleware on the user’s workstation as (1) the smart card has no 
internal clock and (2) cannot set up a connection with a revocation server.  If the service provider 
authenticates successfully to the card, the card authenticates the card holder towards the service provider 
using the right domain-specific certificate.  Hence, only domain-specific identifiers and attributes are 
disclosed.  Optionally, the attributes are not included in clear text into the certificate but are replaced by a 
randomized hash (i.e. Hash(attribute_value_X || random_X)). The clear text and random values (e.g. 
attribute_value_X and random_X) are also stored in the card.  Hence, the card holder can select which 
attributes will be revealed to the service provider.   Alternatively, the domain-specific CA can restrict the 
set of attributes that a service provider can ask for by specifying it in the service provider’s certificate.  A 
combined approach is possible.  The user can then further reduce that set.  This approach makes it harder 
to build profiles across multiple domains.  One major disadvantage of this approach is that the number of 
domains (and attributes per domain) that can be supported depends on the storage capacity of the card.  
However, the storage capacity is not linear to the number of domains.  Multiple optimizations are 
discussed in (Verhaeghe, 2009).  For instance, the random values (used in the randomized hashes) can be 
derived from one secret master value; hence, only that master value needs to be stored in the card.  Also, 
attribute values that are used in multiple domains, only have to be stored once. 
 
In a service-specific approach, citizens are known by a different pseudonym to each service (provider).  
The previous approach with static pre-installed domain-specific certificates is neither flexible nor scalable 
enough to realize service-specific pseudonyms.  A totally different approach will be used in the 
(contactless) German eID card.  First, a mutually authenticated secure channel is set up between the card 
and the service provider.  The card uses an asymmetric key pair that is common to all cards that are issued 
during a certain period.  The server uses an access certificate that is issued by a public authority.  Note 
that the citizen has to enter his PIN code before the card can verify the access certificate.  After mutual 
authentication, the service provider can query the card.  For instance, it can ask whether the citizen is 
older than 18.  The access certificate contains access rights to data on the eID card.  For instance, access 
to the card holder’s address is restricted to service providers that need an address for their business.  Note 
that the data disclosed by the eID card is not signed.  Hence, this data will have no value to third parties 
(as it is not certified).  Only the service provider can be sure about the authenticity of the data.  Moreover, 
the card delivers a service-specific pseudonym based on a randomized UID of the chip and an identifier 
that is included in the server certificate of the service provider.  The German design does not rely on a 
workstation to verify the validity and revocation status of server certificates.  Instead, those cards have a 
notion of time.  The validity of server certificates is limited (from a few days up to one month).  The card 
stores the validity period [T_start, T_end] of the last seen server certificate.  The card no longer accepts 
access certificates with an end date smaller than T_start.  Although the German eID design offers a higher 
level of security and additional measures to protect the user’s privacy compared to the Belgian eID, the 
deployment cost increases considerably: 
a. Service providers have to renew their access certificates very frequently.  Hence, the government 
CAs must be able to automate this procedure.  However, not all services (e.g. cigarette machines) 
are online.  This implies that an administrator has to interfere and visit these machines regularly.  
b. Users are known by a different pseudonym to each service provider.  This means that the 
governments must generate service-provider specific revocation lists.  Those lists are not publicly 
available.  Otherwise, revoked pseudonyms could be linked based on the revocation date.  Hence, 
the government will have to interact with each service provider. 
 
Table 3. Multiple approaches for designing smartcard based electronic identities 
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 User-specific identifier Card-specific identifier 
a. 1 global identifier Belgian eID  
b. 1 nym per domain Domain-specific approach  
c. 1 nym per service  German eID 
 
 
Table 3 and table 4 compare the properties of the Belgian eID (BeID) to the domain-specific approach 
(DomID) and service-provider specific approach (ServID).  Note that nyms in the German eID are card-
specific.  Also notice that the lifetime of server certificates is short in the German eID.  So, many 
applications will not even bother to check revocation lists (see table 4). 
 
Table 4. Verification of server certificates at the client side. 
 At the card At the workstation 
      a. Certificate chain (DomID), (ServID) (BeID) 
      b. Validity period (ServID) (BeID), (DomID) 
      c. Revocation status -- (BeID), (DomID), (ServID) 
 
 
The increased processing power and storage capacity of smart cards offer new opportunities.  More 
advanced applications and cryptographic technologies can be stored on the card.  There is a tendency 
towards moving more functionality from the workstation to the smartcard.  This decreases the level of 
trust a user must have in the workstation.  However, smart cards still have to deal with a number of 
drawbacks: 
o Regular software updates are complicated as the card is only on-line when it is inserted in a 
card reader connected to a workstation that is connected to the Internet. 
o Smartcards do not have a clock.  Hence, the card has to rely on the workstation to check the 
validity of server certificates (or set up a secure connection with a trusted third party). 
o A card reader with display or a workstation is required for user interaction.  Again, trust is 
required in the card reader and/or workstation.  Moreover, only primitive interactions are 
possible with many card readers. 
Many countries therefore explore the possibility to use mobile devices for identity management.  
Examples can be found in (Enisa, 2008).  Mobile devices have multiple benefits compared to smart cards: 
more storage space, processing power, communication options (GPRS, Bluetooth, NFC …) are available.  
Moreover, advanced user interaction is possible (i.e. identities can be managed, personal privacy 
preferences can be configured, connections can be blocked …).   Hence, the user can have more control 
about his actions and the information that is released during transactions.  Finally, a card reader and 
workstation are no longer required.  This increases the mobility of identities.  However, mobile devices 
can also be infected by malware (viruses, Trojan horses …).  Users update the software on mobile devices 
less frequently than on their workstation. 
CONCLUSION 
Serious security and privacy risks impede the development of BeID applications (especially in the 
commercial domain).  The design of the card was driven by a threat model that is reasonable for 
governmental applications.  However, the threat model should be widened when extending the BeID 
technology to other domains (commercial, financial …).  Hence, the current BeID card is a prototypical 
example of a technology that is to be utilized in domains for which it was not designed.  The contribution 
of this chapter is threefold.  First, the barriers that hinder the development of commercial BeID 
applications are classified.  Second, structural solutions are also presented.  Finally, the BeID is compared 
to alternative eID designs.   
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KEY TERMS & DEFINITIONS  
Authentication: establishing or confirming something (or someone) as authentic, that is, that claims made 
by or about the subject are true. 
BeID technology: Belgian Electronic Identity Technology. 
Certificate: an electronic document which uses a digital signature to bind together a public key with an 
identity. 
Electronic signature: any legally recognized electronic means that indicates that a person adopts the 
contents of an electronic message. 
Middleware: computer software that connects software components or applications. 
Public key infrastructure (PKI): a set of hardware, software, people, policies, and procedures needed to 
create, manage, distribute, use, store, and revoke digital certificates. 
Spyware: malware that is installed on computers that collects little bits information at a time about users 
without their knowledge. 
Symmetric key: a key that is used for both encryption and decryption. 
 
 
 
 
 
